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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
SITATE OF UTAH 
HOGAN DAIRY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
CREAl\{[ERY PACKAGE MANU-
FACTURING COl\rfP ANY, a corpo-
ration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9241 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Hogan Dairy, hereinafter referred to as 
I-IOGAN, is a Utah corporation, doing a dairy business 
in the Salt Lake Valley. Defendant, Creamery Package 
Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred to as 
CREAMERY PACKAGE, is an Illinois corporation 
which manufactures and sells Milk Processing Equipment 
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including equipment known as Vac Heat and Ultra High 
Te1nperature Equipment, hereinafter referred to as 
VAC HEAT. 
During the month of April 1958, Blaine Anderson, a 
salesman for ·Creamery Package, approached Hogan to 
sell it a Vac Heat unit. Anderson told Hogan what the 
machine would do in the p-rocessing of milk and gave 
Ifogan literature put out by Creamery Package describ-
ing what the machine would do. (Ex. 2P) The repre-
sentations by Creamery Package were two-fold; first, 
unappetizing flavors and odors would be eliminated from 
milk and the milk would thereby acquire a uniformally 
good flavor and odor; second, the milk processed "\vould 
acquire a longer "shelf life" which, in the industry, is 
understood to mean keeping quality. (Tr. 8, 15) These 
were to be accomplished by subjecting the milk to ultra 
high temperatures, thereby getting a greater kill of bac-
teria normally present in milk and consequently increas-
ing the shelf life because of less action of bacteria, and 
by putting the milk in a vacuum and drawing off the 
volatile portions which contain unwanted flavors and 
odors. 
Hogan evidenced an interest in the machine and a 
desire to acquire it but was "\Yorried about being able 
to finance the transaction. Hogan asked if it could be 
acquired on a rental, instead of a purchase, basis inas-
much as Hogan did not have the $6,300.00 cash needed to 
purchase it and 'vould obtain a tax advantage by renting 
instead of purrhasing on tin1e. (Tr. 17, 65, 320) Cream-
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3 
ery Package had no rental set-up but said that it could 
arrange to accomplish this by having an equipment rental 
company, in the general business of renting all types of 
equipment, acquire the machine and simultaneously lease 
it to Hogan. National Equipment Ltd., hereinafter re-
ferred to as NATIONAl-A a New York corporation, was 
selected as the financing company. 
It was agreed bet,veen IIogan and Creamery Pack-
age, in lieu of Hogan's buying from Creamery Package, 
Creamery Package would sell the Vac Heat to National 
and National would lease it to Hogan, but that delivery 
would be made directly from Creamery Package to 
Hogan and Creamery Package would plan and supervise 
the pToper installation and initial operation thereof. 
(Tr.17-19, 23, 2·4, 302, 328, 346) 
Upon reaching an agreement that IIogan would get 
the machine, Hogan undertook a greatly expanded ad-
vertising program plugging the merits of milk processed 
by \Tac Heat, advertising that it V\'ould have better keep-
ing qualities and a "Hi-Fi" flavor. (Tr. 26, 180, 198) 
Cartons for Hogan milk were ordered which advertised 
the ne"\V process. (Tr. 85, 87, 101) In August of 1958, 
Creamery Package sold the Vac Heat to National and 
National leased it to Hogan, and it was delivered directly 
from Creamery Package to Hogan. (Tr. 27, 326) Cream-
ery Package personnel drew plans and flow sheets and 
designs diagramming the installation, and supervised the 
installation of the Vac Heat, in accordance with the 
agreement. (Tr. 26-28, 328) 
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From the time the machine was first installed trou-
bles developed. (Tr. 29, 30) The milk so processed had 
an unappetizing flavor, a scorched taste and offensive 
odor. (Tr. 31, 103, 106-122, 135-139, 151) In addition to 
the problems of flavor and odor, the milk so processed 
had a very short shelf life and putrefied rapidly. ( Tr. 
106-122, 172) 
These difficulties were at once apparent to Hogan, 
(Tr. 29, 31) not only from their o\vn observations and 
tests but also because of the complaints of customers 
which at once skyrocketed. (Tr. 102, 141) 
Hogan immediately and continuously complained to 
the Creamery Package men of the results obtained. Nu-
merous changes in the installation were made by Cream-
ery Package such as re-positioning valves, changing 
pipes, etc., to reduce the tune the milk was exposed to 
ultra high temperatures. (Tr. 36, 289, 291, 292) On each 
occasion that a complaint was made by Hogan, Creamery 
Package men assured Hogan either that the difficulties 
were not caused by the Vac Heat unit or that the prob-
lems had been or would be ren1edied. (Tr. 46, 47, 1±±, 145, 
14 7' 170, 192, 289, 291, 298, 299, 306, 309, 310, 333, 342, 
343, 344, 397) 
In November of 1958 an air leak in the machine was 
found. Hogan and Creamery Package had suspected a 
leak because excessive foam had al\Yays been encountered 
but it "'"as not found until four months after installation. 
The leak was in a \veld in the \..-ac Heat unit. (Tr. 38) 
The mechanical operation of the machine improved sub-
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stantially after this air leak "\\"as plugged. After the plug-
ging of the air leak, the modifications in installation, and 
the advent of cold weather, the problems ceased. They 
started to re-occur the next summer and when Hogan 
started again to get complaints from customers, it dis-
connected the machine and did not subsequently use it 
and the problems ceased. (Tr. 45) 
The rental contract between National and Hogan 
made Hogan liable for rentals regardless of the quality 
or nature of the operation of the machine by an express 
disclaimer of any warranty on the part of National. (Ex. 
4D) Hogan paid rentals and still has the machine for 
which it has no use. (Tr. 46) 
It would be an understatement to say that l-Iogan 
customers were dissatisfied with the milk processed by 
Vac Heat between August and November. The advertis-
ing campaign was getting new customers but the number 
of new ones could not keep pace with the number of old 
customers quitting. Not only did many retail customers 
quit, but also wholesale outlets were lost, the most im-
portant of which were the Albertson stores, which had 
just been acquired. (Tr. 177) 
Explanations given by some of the experts for the 
problems encountered were as follows: 
A cooked flavor or a scorched taste was imparted 
to the milk by the ultra high heat. In addition to the 
scorched taste, in many instances, there was a putrid 
flavor which could be attributed to the fact that the ultra 
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high heat, in killing off most of the bacteria, killed those 
bacteria which normally create acid which sours milk. 
In doing so, other putrefying bacteria, which in their 
spore form can resist high temperatures and which 
normally are inhibited by acid formed by other types 
of bacteria were left free to develop. The heat resistant 
spores freely and uninhibitedly developed and the milk 
thereby became putrid instead of souring. (Tr. 130) It 
did so at a greatly increased rate so that the shelf life 
instead of being lengthened was shortened and a rotten 
odor rapidly developed in milk so processed if it was not 
ideally refrigerated by the user. (Tr. 105-121, 135-137) 
Some of Creamery Package experts attributed the 
bad flavor and poor shelf life to factors other than the 
use of the Vac Heat unit because Vac Heat had been 
used by dairies in other sections of the country success-
fully. But bacteria present in raw milk, both in their 
spore form and otherwise, vary from area to area (Tr. 
261, 385) so that a process might be successful in one 
area and not in another. The only units vrhich had been 
tried in Utah were both unsuccessful and were removed 
because of probler1s \vith rapid putrefaction a:ad bad 
odors. ( Tr. 129, 132, 215) Hogan's practices in operation 
of the dairy did not change during the period involved 
except in the use of the \.,. ac Heat machine and no such 
problems had arisen before nor did they arise after the 
removal of the unit. (Tr. 411) 
Hogan attributed the following damage to the \Tac 
Heat Unit: 
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Cost of replacement milk, (Tr. 48, 178) 
Loss of employees, (Tr. 152, 174) 
Loss of customers, ( Tr. 157, 160, 171, 226) 
Loss of value of advertising, (Tr. 189) 
Loss of value of promotional expenditures, (Tr. 
190) 
Loss of income, ( Tr. 218) 
Loss of good will, (Tr. 183) 
The Vac Heat unit could easily have been completely 
by-passed and eliminated from the treatment process by 
changing pipe connections, which would have taken about 
20 minutes, (Tr. 295). The ultra high heat could have 
been eliminated by turning off the steam injection valve 
which would have taken a few seconds. Either would 
have eliminated the problems caused by the unit. (Tr. 
365) Hogan did not do either although it knew that 
(a) The flovv of milk through the unit was too slow 
and fluctuated excessively. ( Tr. 29, 31) 
(b) Excessive foam occurred in the unit. (Tr. 31, 
411) 
(c) The milk had a cooked flavor which did not 
dissipate as it should have done. (Tr. 31, 313) 
(d) The milk had a poor shelf life. (Tr. 151) 
(e) Some 1nilk putrefied. (Tr.138) 
(f) There was no cavitation (rattling sound) which 
is necessary for efficient operation. (Tr. 410) 
(g) Complaints of customers tremendously in-
creased. (Tr. 141) 
(h) Customers quit. (Tr. 169) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POIN·T I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IS ERRONEOUS. 
POINT II. 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 1 WAS ERROR. 
POINT III. 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINlTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 3 WAS ERROR. 
POINT IV. 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN·TIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 5 WAS ERROR. 
POINT V. 
ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS 11D AND 12D WAS ERROR. 
). POINT VI. 
THE EVIDEN·CE IS INSUFFICIEN:T TO JUSTIFY THE 
VERDICT AND THE VERDICT IS AGAINST LAW. 
POINT VII. 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR A NEW 'TRIAL. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IS ERRONEOUS. 
The instruction is as follows : 
"You are instructed that if plaintiff continued 
to operate the 1narhinery in question after it dis-
covered, or should have discovered, that the nla-
chinery was not operating properly and that such 
defect in the Var-Heat n1arhinery 'Yas causing the 
contamination of plaintiff's milk product, then 
it was the duty of the plaintiff to desist and re-
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frain from using said machinery and that if plain-
tiff did continue to use said machinery after dis-
covering defects therein, or improper functioning 
of the same, then you are instructed that the 
plaintiff cannot recover for any da1nages result-
ing from continued use after plaintiff had lmowl-
edge, or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have .had knowledge of the defective op·eration of 
the Vac-Heat machinery and that such defect in 
the Vac-Heat machinery was causing the contami-
nation of plaintiff's milk product." 
The reason the use of the unit was not discontinued 
was that Creamery Package men "\vere the experts super-
vising the installation and initial operation and they 
assured Hogan each time a complaint was made, that the 
problems were not caused by Vac-Heat, or the problems 
would be remedied, or the problems had been remedied 
by changes made. Hogan had had no experience with 
the unit and relied on the experience and ability of 
Creamery Package to get it operating properly as it had 
been agreed Creamery Package should do, and as its 
experts said it would and could do. Hogan's entire sales 
promotion was based upon its successful operation. Yet 
the court gave instruction No. 13 which prohibited any 
recovery if Hogan knew-or should have known of defec-
tive operation of the Vac-Heat unit. That was the equi-
valent of giving a directed verdict in favor of Creamery 
Package because the evidence was uncontradicted that 
Hogan knew of flavor and mechanical problems from the 
time of installation and also knew of the shelf life or 
putrefaction problems from the time they arose. Hogan 
always attributed these problems to the Vac-Heat unit. 
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The correct rule qualifies the obligation to stop 
using the unit by relating it to what a reasonable man 
under the circumstances would have done. 
The case of Beagley v. United States Gypsum Com-
pany, 120 U. 487, 235 P. 2d 783, 789, states the rule as be-
ing that plaintiff must do "all a reasonable person would 
have done under like circumstances in order to minimize 
his loss." 
The rule is generally stated in 15 Am. J~tr., Damages, 
Par. 28, as follo,vs: 
"The measure of his duty is such care and 
diligence as a man of ordinary prudence would 
use under the circumstances, and the efforts re-
quired of him must be determined by the rules 
of common sense, good faith, and fair dealing. 
What constitutes reasonable care depends upon 
the circumstances of the particular case, taking 
into consideration time, knowledge, opportunity, 
and expense.'' 
In applying this generalized statement, it is further 
stated as follows : 
"An injured person may recover to the full 
extent of his injury where he shows reasonable 
grounds for his failure to make an effort to lesson 
his damages. Thus, the repeated assurance of the 
defendant after an injury has begun that he will 
remedy the condition is sufficient justification for 
the plaintiff's failure to take steps to minimize 
loss, so long, at least, as there is ground for ex-
pecting that he will perform." 
Norfolk & liV. R. Co. v. A1nicon Fr,uit Co., ( C.C.A. 
4th) 269 F. 559, 14 A.L.R. 547. 
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An annotation in 81 A.L.I!. 282 on "Duty to ~liti­
gate Dan1ages" discusses various cases, some of which 
discussion is quoted. 
"The obligation to minimize damages never 
requires a party to exercise more than reasonable 
care to that end (Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sandlin 
(1925) 209 Ky. 442, 272 S.W. 912) 
"The rule is simply one of good faith and 
fair dealing. Gilbert v. Kennedy (1871) 22 Mich. 
117. It does not require one to do his utmost to 
minimize damages, without regard to his own 
interests, but only what is reasonable under the 
circumstances. Bridgeport v. Aetna Indem. ·Co., 
(1919) 93 Conn. 277, 105 Atl. 680." 
The case of Lopeman v. Gee, 40 vVash. 2d 586, 245 
P. 2d 183, deals with a similar problen1. Headnote 7, 
is as follows: 
"Where owners of stored onions complained 
to agents of warehouseman that onions were 
sweating and becoming damp and mouldy and, 
upon each occasion, were assured that the storage 
conditions complained of would be remedied, own-
ers were entitled to rely upon these assurances 
and did not have duty to mitigate damages by 
taking onions out of storage as soon as they learn-
ed of threatened loss." 
The Court said: 
"Appellant urges it was respondents' duty to 
mitigate damages by taking the onions out of stor-
age as soon as they learned of the threatened loss. 
It is true, one is ordinarily required to make rea-
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sonable efforts to avoid the consequence of an-
other's wrongful act by avoiding any consequences 
resulting therefrom. However, if, after an injury 
is begun, there are repeated assurances from the 
wrongdoer that the condition complained of will 
be rem~died, there is no duty upon the part of 
the injured party to take steps to minimize the 
loss so long as there are grounds to expect that he 
'vill perform. Florence Fish Co. v. Everett Pack-
ing Co., 111 Wash. 1, 188 P. 792; McCormick, Dam-
ages, 140, Sec. 38; Annotation, 81 A.L.R. 282 at 
page 284. 
"The trial court found that 'plaintiffs com-
plained to agents of defendant in charge of said 
storage and upon each occasion were assured that 
the storage condition complained of would be 
remedied.' Plaintiffs, under the circumstances of 
this case, were entitled to rely upon these assur-
ances." 
See also Sears Roebuck v. Grant, ______ Wash. ______ , 
298 P. 2d 497. 
The repeated assurances of the defendant after an 
injury has begun, that he will remedy the condition, 
is sufficient justification for the plaintiff's failure to 
take steps to minimize loss, so long, at least, as there 
is ground for expecting that he will perform. Kentucky 
DistiJlleriJes & W arehou,se Co. v. Lillard (1908) 87 C. 
C.A. 190, 160 F. 34; Illinois C.R.C. v. Doss (1910) 137 
Ky. 658, 126 S.W. 349. 
Furthermore, the duty to mitigate damages does 
not relate to the performance of the primary obligations 
of the contract. So, 'vhere one "'"hose duty it is to do work 
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necessary to fulfill a contract had equal knowledge of the 
consequences of noncompliance and opportunity to fulfill 
the obligation, he alone may be depended on to perform 
the duty, and it will not avail him to say the injured party 
might have lessened the damages. Louisville, N.A. & C.R. 
Co. v. Sttmner (1886) 106 Ind. 55, 55 Am. Rep. 719, 5 NE 
404. Therefore, since the primary obligation of the 
agreement was that Creame·ry Package would install the 
machine and get it functioning properly, Creamery Pack-
age could not defend on the ground that Hogan is barred 
because it knew the unit was operating improperly. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision deny-
ing a motion for a new trial tacitly admitted that instruc-
tion No. 13 is erroneous by stating "Although the Instruc-
tion No. 13 might have been modified to meet the criti-
cisms of the cases cited by counsel for plaintiff, it 
seemed to fit the circumstances and requirements of our 
lawsuit and is thought not to be prejudicial in any event" 
because of Instruction No. 16. But Instruction No. 16 
was merely an instruction that damages must be the 
natural and probable result of the breach of contract. 
Instruction 16 reads as follows: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
"If you resolve in favor of the plaintiff the 
issue as to whether or not there was a contract 
between the parties, as required by the foregoing 
instruction, you are instructed that the damages 
which plaintiff is entitled to recover in resp·ect 
to such breach of contract are those as may fairly 
and reasonably be considered, either arising 
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naturally and probably, that is, according to the 
natural course of things, from such breach, and 
as such as may reasonably be supposed to have 
been in contemplation of the parties at the time 
they made the contract, as the probable result of 
its breach. 
"Recoverable elements of damage may in-
clude, among other elements, injury to business 
reputation, loss of business standing, loss of cus-
tomers or business, loss of employees. The profits 
which would have been realized had the contract 
been performed, and which have been prevented 
by its breach, are included in the damages which 
may be recovered if they are the natural and 
proximate result of the breach complained of and 
are capable of ascertainment with reasonable cer-
tainty.'' 
Reading 16 and 13 together the plain meaning is that 13 
restricts 16 so that those damages which are the natural 
and probable result of the breach of contract are recover-
able only if Hogan did not and should not have kno"Tn 
that Vac-Heat was causing the trouble. How can an in-
struction which bars recovery be non-prejudicial~ 
The trial court further stated in its memorandum 
decision that "Instruction 13 was directed to and related 
only to what might be called subsequent damages-The 
conclusion seems justified, therefore, that the jury found 
that there was no contract." Such reasoning would be 
true only if there were an initial period during which 
Hogan did not blame Vac He-at for the problems en-
countered. The evidence is clear that Hogan knew of 
improper functioning beginning with the very first oper-
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ation in August and continuing into November. (Tr. 29-
32, 46, 144, 145, 192, 289, 291, 299, 307, 313, 332) Under 
instruction 13 Hogan had a duty to immediately stop us-
ing the unit and therefore the jury could not find in its 
favor. 
POINT II. 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 1 WAS ERROR. 
The requested instruction was a.s follows: 
"INSTRUCTIOl~ NO. 1 
''You are instrureted that the evidence is un-
contradicted, that plaintiff .and defendant agreed 
a.s follows : 
"Defendant agreed to sell to N a.tional Equip-
ment Rental Limited a Vac Heat Unit. Plaintiff 
agreed to lease s.aid V ac Heat Unit from the 
Rental Co1npany. Defendant did sell to the Rental 
Company and plaintiff did lease from the Rental 
Company said unit. Defendant further agreed 
th.a t for and in consideration of plaintiff agreeing 
to lease said unit from the Leasing Comp,any de-
fendant would ship said unit directly to plaintiff, 
defendant would sup·ervise the installation of said 
unit according to plans and specifications fur-
nished by defendant, defendant would furnish the 
technical personnel necessary to install said unit 
in proper operating condition, defendant would 
furnish qualified personnel to instruct plaintiff 
in the prop-er operation of said unit. The evidence 
is further undisputed that defendant represented 
and agreed with plaintiff that if plaintiff acquired 
said unit and used it in the processing of its milk 
that said unit would improve the flavor of milk 
so processed and vvould improve the keeping qual-
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ities or shelf life of said milk. You are therefore 
instructed that there is no issue as to whether or 
not there was an agreement between the parties 
and you are instructed that there was an agree-
ment as above de-scribed.'' 
The evidence of th-e facts set forth in the request 
1s uncontradicted. The testimony of Max Hogan (Tr. 
6-24) established the agreement. ·This testimony was 
not only not eontradicted but was corroborated by the 
testimony of Blaine Anderson who made the agreement 
on behalf of Creamery Package and who certainly would 
have corrected any misstatement by Max Hogan. It was 
therefore the duty of the court to instruct that there 
was a contract and submit to the jury only the question 
of breach and damage rather than to let the _jury spec-
ulate on the existenee or non-existence of an agreement. 
Moore, in discussing the Federal practice, which 
Utah should follow, says: 
''Where no evidence is adduced to disprove 
the prima facie ease of the plaintiff and his evi-
dence stands uncontradicted and unimpeached, the 
court should direct." 5 III oore' s Federal Practice, 
2314, Note 7. 
In Cannan v. Curkeet, 86 F. 2d 573, the court said: 
"It is elementary that, in Federal courts, 
where undisputed evidence den1ands a verdict in 
favor of one of t·he parties, it is the duty of the 
judge to direct it. '' 
In Brandon v. Holman, 41 F. 2d 586, a bank cashier, 
according to the undisputed testimony, improperly paid 
out .money for his own gain. In affirming a verdict for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
the plain tiff the court said : 
'' The verdict should be directed when the 
evidence . . . with all inferences that the jury 
could draw from it, leads to but one conclusion.'' 
In Colthurst v. Lake View State Bank, 18 F. 2d 875, 
in a suit on a note, where the only evidence was to the 
effect that plaintiff was a holder in due course without 
notiee, a directed verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed. 
The court said that defendant does not have the right 
"to have a jury pass upon his claim'' nor does "credi-
bility of an uncontradicted and unimpeached witness in 
all cases" present a jury question. 
In Campagnie Generale Transatlant~que v. Amer~ 
can Tobacco Co., 31 F. 2d '663, in affirming a directed 
verdict for the plaintiff, the court said: 
"When the plaintiff in error failed to make 
answer to the prima f.acie evidence offered . . . 
it was the duty of the court below to direct the 
verdict.'' 
In F~rst National Bank & Trust Company of Musko-
gee v. Heilman, 62 F. 2d 157, in a suit on a note, where 
the only evidence was to the effect that plaintiff was 
a holder in due course without notice, a directed verdict 
for the plaintiff was denied by the lower court. This was 
reversed. ·The court said : 
''There are two classes of cases in which the 
trial court should direct a verdict at the close of 
the evidence (1) cases in which the evidence is 
undisputed and (2) cases in whieh the evidence is 
conflicting but is of so conclusive a character 
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that the court in the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion ought to set aside a verdict in oppo-
sition thereto .... The rule applies notwithstand-
ing the party introducing the evidence has the 
burden of proof. . . . The instant case clearly 
falls within the first class and the trial court 
erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the 
bank.'' 
53 Am. Jur. ·Trials. 
"359. Undisputed Facts Supporting One 
Conclusion. - The presence or absence of con-
flicting testimony in a case is a consideration by 
which the courts are governed in directing ver-
dicts. Where the material issues or controlling 
facts are conceded, or the proof offered to estab-
lish them is undisputed, uncontradicted, or uncon-
troverted, or such facts are conclusively estab-
lished or established beyond dispute, or the evi-
dence is all one way, and is unconflicting and 
uncont.radictory, and only one legitimate infer-
ence may he drawn, and there are no circum-
stances which tend to impair or impe.ach it, and 
it is not 8Usceptible of inherent weaknesses, im-
probabilities, and incongruities which in and of 
themselves naturally arise to contradict or im-
peach the weight and credibility of the utterances 
of the witnesses, the only question being one of 
law, the court may, should, and must, direct a 
verdict.'' 
"361. Uncontradicted Oral Testimony.-While 
it is the province of the jury to determine not 
only the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, 
but the credibility of the witnesses who testify, 
this rule is not to be taken· as necessarily requir-
ing the trial eourt to overrule a motion for a 
directed verdict and sub1nit a case to the jury 
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in order to permit the jury to pass upon the cred-
ibility of .a witness whose testimony is unimpeach-
ed and uncontradi,cted, and reasonably susceptible 
to but one conclusion. - the more generally ap-
proved rule is that it is not only permissible, but 
proper, for a trial court to direct, upon uniin-
peaehed oral testimony given in behalf. of the 
party having the burden of proof, where such tes-
timony is direct, positive, and unequivocal, is not 
contradicted either directly or indirectly, and is 
not suseeptible of inherent weakness, improbabil-
ity, or incredibility. This principle underlies the 
great majority of the cases cited in the preceding 
sections whieh recognize it to be not only within 
the povver, but the duty, of the court to direct 
verdicts when undisputed facts support only one 
conclusion, or where a contrary verdict would 
have no sup·port in the evidence.'' 
'' 386. When Verdict M.ay Be Directed. -
Again, the plaintiff is entitled to a direction in 
his favor where the right to reeover is overwhelm-
ingly shown, where the plaintiff's evidence is 
sufficient to \Varrant a verdict in his favor and 
no evidence has been adduced by the defendant 
appreciably tending to overthrow the case made 
by the plaintiff.'' 
"Where there is no evidence, direct or circum-
stantial, tending to impeach the witness upon 
whose testimony an issue is based, the court 
should give mandatory instruction." Cvti.zens 
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Stackhouse, 91 SC 455, 74 
SE 977, 40 LRA (NS) 454. 
"Where the plaintiff's evidence makes a 
prima facie case, and the defendant offers no 
evidence, the court should, on motion, direct a 
verdict for the plaintiff." Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt. 
412, 108 A. 267, 18 ALR 1426. 
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"It is fundamental that where there is no 
evidence upon a material part of the plaintiff's 
claim, it is the court's duty to direct a verdict. 
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the 
court must consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion 
is directed and must resolve every controverted 
fact in his favor. Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 
295, 209 P. 2·d 566. The inquiry, then, must be dir-
ected toward whether reasonable minds could dis-
agree in this case on the evidence presented so as 
to provide a question for the jury." Boskov~ch v. 
Utah Canst. Co., 123 U. 387, 259 P 2d 885, 886. 
"The credibility, sufficiency, and weight of 
the evidence on a given subject are for the jury; 
the question whether there is any evidence on the 
subject is for the court. Where the testimony is 
all one way, uncontradicted by any testimony 
given in the case, either from a party's own \Yit-
nesses or the other side, either in direct or cross-
examination, or by any facts or circumstances 
in the case, and is not in itself in any way im-
probable or discredited, and but one legitimate 
inference may be dra\vn from it, and a case is 
thereby made for the plaintiff or the defendant, 
the duty rests upon the court to direct a verdict." 
Bo~tdeman v. Arnold (1918) 200 ~fich. 162, 166 
NW 985, 8 ALR 789. 
POINT III. 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 3 WAS ERROR. 
Requested Instruction No. 3 \Yas as follo\YS: 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
''You are instructed that if you believe that 
the unit, a.s designed by defendant, \vould not 
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p-rocess milk properly and if you further believe 
from a preponderance of the evidence that de-
fendant had ,agreed with plaintiff that the ma-
chine would process milk properly, then defend-
ant is liable to plaintiff for the natural and prob-
able results of the breach of said agreement, if 
any." 
One of Hogan's theories upon which it might recover 
under the evidence before the jury was that even if the 
mechanical functioning of the machine were satisfactory, 
that the design and plan of installation ·of the machine 
was such that, as installed in the Hogan Dairy, the milk 
proces.sed through it acquired a scorched or a burned 
flavor and putrefied rapidly. By failing to give this 
instruction, the court p-resented to the jury only the 
question of whether or not the machine functioned prop-
erly. The court thereby eliminated the questions of 
whether or not the machine was properly enginee-red and 
whether or not the design and plan of installation were 
proper. The testimony that many changes were made by 
Creamery Package in the initial installation, including 
subsequent repositioning of valves which cut the time of 
exposure of milk to ultr.a high heat in half, (Tr. 40, 293, 
307) was proper evidence upon which the jury might well 
have found that the initial installation was improperly 
designed and p·lanned resulting in scorching and related 
p·roblems. 
POINT IV. 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN'TIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 5 WAS ERROR. 
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The requested instruction was as follows.: 
''If you find in favor 'Of Plaintiff and find 
that milk process.ed by Vac Heat did not have a 
longer shelf-life as represented by Defendant that 
it would have, it is no defense on the part of 
Defendant that bacteria or spores were already 
in the milk as it came from the farmers if it 
could reasonably he anticipated that, under usual 
and ordinary circumstances in the area involved, 
such sp·ores or bacteria would be present in such 
milk.'' 
Defendant's witness, :Th{r. Hedrick, testified that in 
his opinion flavor problems could have been caused by 
bacteria which were in the raw milk. (Tr. 360-361) 
George Donald, the manager of Cloverleaf Dairy, testi-
fied that in his opinion the rapid putrefaction of milk 
was caused by killing only a part of the bacteria and 
spores which were already in the raw milk, but killing 
substantially all acid forming bacteria so that bacteria 
which caused putrefaction had an unhibited gro\\ih. 
(Tr. 130) R.equested Instruction No. 5 \Yas therefore 
necessary in order to cover fully the factual situation 
presented to the jury. 
POINT V. 
ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS llD AND 12D WAS ERROR. 
These two exhibits were blank forms, one being an 
order blank and the other being a form for a contract 
of conditional sale. In both of then1 Crerunery Package 
disclaimed liability for defective equipment. Hogan had 
never seen either these or si1nilar documents. (Tr 351) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
Hogan had no kn·owledge of the disclaimer of liability 
contained therein and yet the court allowed the intro-
duction of both of these documents over strenuous ob-
jection that they were not material to the issue in the 
case. ( Tr. 340). Counsel for defendant used these ex-
hibits and the dis,claimers contained therein in his argu-
ment to the jury, arguing that the disclaimer of liability 
contained therein exonerated defendant from liability. 
Such an uncommunicated limitation and disclaimer of 
liability should not have been presented to the jury. 
Defendant should not be exonerated from responsibility 
for its express representations as to what Vac Heat 
would do by provisos in blank forms it takes out of its 
office files of which plaintiff has no knowledge whatever. 
POINT VI. 
THE EVIDEN,CE IS INSUFFICIEN'T TO JUSTIFY THE 
VERDICT AND THE VERDICT IS AGAINST LAW. 
The evidence is uncontradicted th.at there w.as a 
contract that defendant would install the unit and get it 
operating properly. The evidence is also uncontradicted 
that the unit did not operate properly and that Hogan 
suffered damage. There is therefore no legal basis for 
the verdict of no cause of action rendered by six of the 
eight jurors. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The above points were raised by plaintiff on its 
motion for new trial whi·ch the court, in the exercise of 
sound discretion, should have granted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prejudioial error was committed and the judgment 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN·S, BRAYTON & LOWE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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